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ABSTRACT: Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that 
access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a 
phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content  can 
be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while 
Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access 
consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between 
phenomenality and access in term of the second notion that is not touched by Block’s 
argument. 
 
 
Ned Block in a series of papers (Block, 1990, 1995, 2002) has made a conceptual 
distinction between the phenomenality of a mental state (aka its phenomenal character or 
the quale it instantiates) and access consciousness of the same state. There is a view – 
Block calls it “epistemic correlationism” – according to which the metaphysical 
relationship between these two is not scientifically tractable. While cognitive 
accessibility is intrinsic to our knowledge of phenomenology, it might or might not be 
constitutive of the phenomenal facts themselves. According to the epistemic 
correlationist, there is no possible empirical evidence that could tell us one way or 
another. This view is Block’s main target. The thesis of his paper is that the issue of the 
relationship between phenomenal and access consciousness is an empirical issue, and, 
moreover, it is approachable by the same empirical methods we employ in science in 
general. Block’s aim is to show that by looking at the relevant data, and employing the 
method of inference to the best explanation, we can already mount an argument for the 
specific thesis that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for 
phenomenality. If this is so, he has given reasons to reject “metaphysical correlationism” 
as well, i.e., the view that the cognitive access relations that underlie reportability are 
constitutive of phenomenology. 
 
Block’s thesis, however, needs further clarification. A phenomenal state can be access 
conscious in two radically different ways. Its content (or part of its content) can be access 
conscious, or its phenomenal character can be access conscious. Say, I am having a 
visual experience of a red circle in an orange background. In this case, both the content 
and the phenomenal character of this experience can be access conscious. I can be aware 
that I am seeing a red circle in an orange background, and I can also be aware that my 
experience has such and such a phenomenal character. However, in the experiments that 
Block discusses in his article, the two kinds of access come apart. As a result, while 
Block’s thesis holds if understood as involving the first notion of access, an alternative 
thesis involving the second sense of access can be formulated that is untouched by 
Block’s arguments. Let me first explain Block’s thesis and his defense of it, and then 
sketch an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access 
that survives Block’s argument.  
 
Consider the following kind of experiment which provides crucial support for Block’s 
thesis. Following Sperling’s (1960) famous experiments, Landman and his colleagues 
(2003), showed subjects 8 rectangles in different orientations for half a second. The 
resulting experience e has a – presumably non-conceptual (pictorial or iconic) – 
representational content r, and, according to the introspective reports of subjects, a 
phenomenal character p.1 Given the model of access consciousness assumed in Block’s 
paper as broadcasting of conceptual representations in a global workspace (Baars (1988, 
1997), Block takes e to be access conscious iff conceptual representations of  e’s content 
are present in the global workspace. In other words, e is access conscious iff there are 
conceptual representations in the global workspace that extract the content of e (e.g., 
“There were rectangles of the following orientations…”).  
 
That typically we are not access conscious in this sense of all aspects of a phenomenal 
experience’s content is convincingly shown by the Landman et. al. (2003) experiments. 
After the brief exposure, subjects are only able to report on the precise orientation of up 
to four of these rectangles. This experiments show, to my mind conclusively, that access 
consciousness of this sort – i.e., the existence of conceptual representations in global 
workspace that extract all the relevant content of e – is not constitutively necessary for 
the phenomenality of the experience. This finding is further supported by the 
neurophysiological data Block cites which shows the neural implementation of sensory 
representations and the neural implementation of global access to be physically separate 
and independent from each other.  
 
However, these experiments – which comprise the bulk of Block’s supporting evidence – 
don’t show that no access is constitutively necessary for phenomenality. Notice that the 
above interpretation of the Sperling (1960) and Landman et. al. (2003) experiments 
crucially relies on the subjects’ introspective report of the phenomenality of their entire 
visual experience, including those aspects of the experience whose content is not access 
conscious. (Dehaene and Naccache (2001) question the accuracy of these reports but I 
find that move implausible.) Introspective access to the phenomenality of the entire 
experience was part of the evidence in the Sperling and Landman experiments for why 
access to the conceptualized content of the experience is not necessary for 
phenomenality. But this data leaves the room open for the hypothesis that access to the 
phenomenality of the experience is constitutively necessary for that phenomenality. How 
exactly should we think about access to the phenomenality of the experience if it is not 
access to its conceptualized content? 
 
Notice that the representations in the global workspace that are not constitutively 
necessary for phenomenality are separate from the representations whose phenomenality 
is in question. Phenomenal experience quite plausibly involves non-conceptual 
representation; representations that enter the global workspace, on the other hand, are 
conceptual representations. There are different representations involved. What about 
access to the phenomenality of the experience itself? It seems plausible that the 
relationship between phenomenality and the representation of it that is in the global 
workspace is more intimate. Here is an idea. Perhaps phenomenality requires that a 
conceptual representation of the phenomenal character of the experience itself is in the 
global workspace. Plausibly, this would not be any old conceptual representation of the 
phenomenality of the experience, but a phenomenal representation involving phenomenal 
concepts. On a plausible account of phenomenal concepts, the constitutional account (see 
e.g., Papineau, 2002), phenomenal concepts – in their canonical, first person, present 
tense applications relevant to these experiments – are partly constituted by the experience 
they refer to. That is, the first person present tense judgment that e has phenomenal 
character p is partly constituted by e itself. The thesis then would be that phenomenality 
is only possible if the relevant phenomenal judgment is in the global workspace. Notice 
that here the experience whose phenomenality is at issue and the state in global 
workspace that constitutes access to it are not separate and independent. The conceptual 
representation in the global workspace involves e itself and this adds to the plausibility of 
the idea that this kind of access is intrinsic to phenomenality.  
 
Unlike the thesis Block is criticizing – let’s call it the Accessc Thesis –, this thesis – let’s 
call it the Accessp Thesis – seems to be a viable hypothesis. None of the data discussed by 
Block rule it out, or even make it implausible. But if the Accessp Thesis is true, then some 
interesting consequences follow, e.g., that, despite suggestions to the contrary by Block, 
activations in the “fusiform face area” of “visuo-spatial extinction” patients could not be 
phenomenal.  
 
The issue of epistemic correlationism can be raised all over again with respect to the 
Accessp Thesis. Is it the case that in time we might find empirical evidence that supports 
or refutes the thesis, or is it the case, as the epistemic correlationist claims, that we are not 
epistemically situated to ever find out? One might argue that no empirical evidence could 
be decisive. Take a representation that is not accessp conscious, e.g., a representation r 
involved in early visual processing. In the absence of direct introspective evidence 
(involving accessp consciousness) for the phenomenality of r, for any explanation that 
appeals to the phenomenality of r, one can construct another explanation that appeals to 
the mere proto-phenomenality of r, where r is proto-phenomenal just in case were r 
accessp conscious, it would be phenomenal. It is hard to see how appeal to phenomenality 
can be explanatorily superior to appeal to proto-phenomenality. Considerations of 
simplicity or informativeness will not cut one way or another. Epistemic correlationism 
with respect to accessp consciousness then seems to be a viable position despite all the 
psychological and neurophysiological data amassed about conscious experience.  
 
Footnotes:  
 
1. I want to sidestep the issue of representationalism about qualia here. All I assume is 
that e has r and p; I won’t discuss the relationship between r and p. Back to text.  
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